Arbitrage, hedging, and financial innovation by DOW, James



























































































































































































EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE, FLORENCE 
ECONOMICS DEPARTMENT
UP 3 3 0  
EUR
EUI Working Paper ECO No. 96/6
Arbitrage, Hedging, and Financial Innovation
JAMES DOW




























































































No part of this paper may be reproduced in any form 
without permission of the author.
© James Dow
Printed in Italy in March 1996 
European University Institute 
Badia Fiesolana 





























































































Arbitrage, Hedging, and Financial Innovation
James Dow
European University Institute 
do w@datacomm. iue. it
March 1995, second revision December 1995
Abstract: I present a simple model in which it is possible that opening a new 
market makes everybody worse off. Unlike previous examples in the literature, 
the analysis does not rely on relative price changes of different consumption 
goods. This is shown in a standard framework in which uninformed traders 
with hedging needs interact with risk-averse informed traders, in security 
markets where prices are set by a competitive market-making system. The 
paper emphasises cross-market links between hedging and speculative demands: 
risk-averse arbitrageurs can hedge in the new market to lower the risk of 
speculative positions in the pre-existing market. This causes a greater incidence 
of speculative activity in the old market, leading some traders with pure 
hedging motives in that market to withdraw and reducing liquidity in the old 
market. The general point argued here is that a risk-averse informed trader 
who believes an asset to be mispriced will typically be able to reduce the risk 
of speculating on his belief by hedging with other assets. The availability of 
such hedging instruments will in turn determine which types of speculative 
activity are of low risk, and this will influence the strategies to which traders 
will devote resources. Journal o f Economic Literature classification numbers 
G12, D60, D82, G18.
I thank Franklin Allen, David Cass, Ian Cooper, Gary Gorton, Rich Kihlstrom, 
Murgie Krishnan, Ernst Maug, Narayan Naik, Sam Orez, Rohit Rahi, Sergio 
Werlang and two anonymous referees for comments on earlier drafts of this 






















































































































































































This paper has two purposes. First, it is motivated by an interest in the general 
question of the economic costs and benefits of financial innovation. A 
comprehensive treatment of this question is probably beyond the scope of 
current research and certainly beyond the scope of this paper, which confines 
itself to a narrower problem within this general area. In particular, it seeks to 
apply the standard methods of analysis of welfare economics (particularly Pareto 
ranking) to a model of a security market equilibrium in which a new security 
is introduced. The structure of this model is itself standard in finance research: 
asymmetric information about asset values, price formation by a market-maker, 
interaction between informed and uninformed traders. However, welfare 
analysis of this type of model is rare and has not previously been used to study 
the value of financial innovation.
The second, and subsidiary, purpose of this paper is to explore the links 
between arbitrage and hedging demands for securities. A trader who believes 
a security to be mispriced will generally not be able to predict the value with 
certainty: in other words, trading in the security will expose him to risk. 
However, by simultaneously trading in other securities he may be able to hedge 
these risks, at least partially and sometimes even perfectly. Hence a large 
volume of hedging demand for securities may actually emanate from arbitrage 
activity. It is this link that is explored in this paper to analyze the effects of 
introducing a new security.
Financial Innovation
The general problem of understanding the benefits and costs of financial 



























































































this area remain open for research: Does opening a market tend to increase 
economic welfare? If the market in a new security attracts many traders does 
this indicate that the market is beneficial?
The First Welfare Theorem of general equilibrium theory shows that an 
economy with complete markets is Pareto efficient. Hence, introducing new 
markets to an economy with incomplete markets will make at least one person 
better off - so long as sufficient new markets are introduced to make the set of 
markets complete. The statement that at least one agent is better off is of 
course very weak, but it is the strongest statement that can be hoped for in 
general. Hence considerable research effort has been devoted to investigating 
its validity.
The condition that markets be complete in the literal sense required to apply this 
result could presumably never be attained in reality. Yet, introducing some 
new markets without opening all conceivable markets can in principle make 
everybody worse off. It is simple to generate such examples when there are 
non-pecuniary externalities: if a market opens for cars that produce noxious 
emissions, but there is no market for regulating pollution, we might all suffer 
more from choking on the fumes than we benefit from motoring. However, 
this type of externality seems unlikely to prevail in financial markets. Examples 
have also been derived of how opening financial markets could make everybody 
worse off: Hart (1975), Newbery and Stiglitz (1984) and Kemp and Sinn 
(1993). Indeed, Cass and Citanna (1995) and Elul (1995) show that, with more 
than one consumption good, it is always possible to make everybody worse off 
by introducing a new security. On the other hand, they also show that these 
welfare effects are based on the idea that introducing a new market changes the 




























































































and that if there is only a single consumption good ("money"), introducing a 
new market must make at least one agent better off. This general result applies 
to the standard model of general equilibrium theory, i.e. Walrasian, price-taking 
market clearing and perfect information.
In contrast, much research in finance has focused on a different type of model: 
security prices and trading volume are determined by the interplay of traders 
who trade because they have superior information, and those who trade for non- 
informational reasons such as liquidity or hedging needs. Following Kyle 
(1985) and Glosten and Milgrom (1985), much of the literature has relied on 
a competitive market-maker to set prices and clear the market. As standard in 
the finance literature, these models use a single consumption good: they do not 
investigate, and the results do not depend on, relative price changes of different 
commodities.
This paper uses this framework to consider the welfare effect of adding a new 
security. Although, with the market for the new security open, markets are not 
complete in the Arrow-Debreu sense, they are complete enough to allow agents 
to construct a perfect hedge against their initial risk exposure.
Arbitrage and Hedging
The basic idea explored in this paper is of cross-market links between hedging 
and speculative demands. Agents may be speculators in one market and 
hedgers in another, and these roles may be linked: they may use the first market 
to lay off part of the risk of their speculative position in the second market. 
Indeed, although the term "arbitrage” strictly speaking refers to an entirely 
riskless profitable trading strategy, even the least risky speculative trades 




























































































sense common among practitioners, to describe an informed trade that is highly 
profitable in relation to its risk. The general point argued here is that a risk- 
averse informed trader who believes an asset to be mispriced will typically be 
able to reduce the risk of speculating on his belief by hedging with other assets. 
The availability of such hedging instruments will in turn determine which types 
of speculative activity are of low risk, and this will influence the types of 
speculative strategies to which traders will devote resources.
The following examples include both cases of virtually risk-free arbitrages, and 
of risky speculative positions where the risk may be reduced but not eliminated. 
(1) In stock index arbitrage, an investment bank buys individual stocks and sells 
short an index futures contract. To reduce transaction costs and execution 
problems, the stock portfolio consists of a much smaller number of stocks than 
the whole index, leaving a residual tracking risk. (2) An investment bank may 
hold a speculative position in Latin American external debt (denominated in 
US$) because it believes the probability of default to be implicitly overestimated 
by the current market prices. This speculative position exposes it to movements 
in US interest rates, and it can hedge the exposure using interest rate futures. 
(3) Stock-pickers buy individual stocks they believe to be underpriced relative 
to the market in general, and hedge exposure to overall market movements by 
selling short index futures. (4) A bank taking a short position in the interest 
rate swap spread (the spread between the swap rate and the Treasury bond rate) 
would hold a swap portfolio that is short the fixed side of the swap and long the 
floating side, and hedge it with a long position in bond futures, generating a 
hedging demand for bond futures that arises as a by-product of the development 
of the swap market. (5) A typical "arbitrage" position in the government bond 
market will consist of a combination of long and short positions in different 




























































































mispriced while minimizing exposure to other risks. (6) Finally, one of the 
main trading strategies that the management of Barings apparently believed their 
trader Nick Leeson to be engaged in was a nearly risk-free arbitrage combining 
a long position in one contract, Nikkei 225 stock index futures traded on the 
Osaka Securities Exchange, with an offsetting short position in a closely related 
contract traded on SIMEX.
The paper
This paper shows that opening a financial market in a new security can in 
principle make everybody worse off. The intuition for the result is 
straightforward: risk-averse arbitrageurs can use hedging in the new market to 
eliminate the risk of speculative positions in the pre-existing market. This 
causes a greater incidence of arbitrage activity in the old market, leading some 
traders with pure hedging motives in that market to withdraw. Liquidity in the 
old market is reduced, as manifested by a greater bid-ask spread for trades. 
This illiquidity can harm both arbitrageurs and hedgers. These cross-market 
liquidity effects are similar to the "destructive interference" between different 
securities in Bhattacharya, Reny and Spiegel (1995), but they are weaker 
because in the case studied in this paper, the market does not close completely. 
In the context of a single security market, Glosten (1989), Bhattacharya and 
Spiegel (1991) and Spiegel and Subramanyan (1992) have studied market 
breakdown due to an excessive incidence of informed trading.
The model presented in this paper is a simple one. The question of whether all 
agents may be made worse off is of course a very narrow one (albeit a central 
one in welfare economics). The model also abstracts from many potentially 
important effects of financial innovation, for example the possible improvement 




























































































paper studies an exchange economy with no production). However, the welfare 
economics of financial market innovation is at present at an early stage of 
development (see Allen and Gale (1994) and Duffie and Rahi (1995) for surveys 
of research on related questions). The importance of understanding the 
economic welfare implications of speculative trading and securities market 
innovation, particularly for markets in derivative securities, seems self-evident. 
The analysis in this paper is intended as a preliminary step towards achieving 
a better understanding of this question.
The rest of the paper shows the result in the context of a formal model: section 
2 describes the model; section 3 describes equilibrium in the pre-existing 
market; section 4 describes equilibrium when the new market opens. The 
possibility of Pareto inferior innovation is demonstrated in section 5. Section 
6 presents brief concluding remarks.
2. The Model
I consider a model with two periods. In the first period, agents trade securities. 
In the second period, securities’ payoffs are realized and agents consume. The 
securities may be thought of as derivative contracts, or alternatively as stocks 
that pay a liquidating dividend, or as zero-coupon bonds. The interpretation as 
derivative contracts will perhaps seem most natural to the reader. In order to 
provide an example that displays the desired properties in an intuitive way, 
random variables and utility functions will be assumed to have the simplest 
functional forms, and the number of securities (two) and of agents (two types 






























































































The first security has an uncertain payoff x". This may be decomposed into 
two independent components, x = y + z . The second security has an 
uncertain payoff y . The random variables y and z are each equally likely to 
take the values +1 and — 1 (hence x" takes the value 0 with probability Vi, and 
the values —2 and +2 each with probability !4). The assumption that the 
expected values of the securities are of mean zero is WLOG: one can interpret 
the variables treated here as deviations from the mean, and add on the mean as 
a constant in all expressions for valuations and prices.
Agents
There are two main types of agents. The first type (hedgers) are risk-averse 
and have risky endowments which they can hedge by trading suitable quantities 
of the securities. The second type of agent (an arbitrageur) may also be risk- 
averse but is not endowed with risk initially. He has private information about 
the value of the first security, x , although he cannot predict its value perfectly 
(he learns z"). Taking a position in this security therefore exposes him to risk 
(which he may choose to hedge using the other security, y , if it is traded). 
The relative frequencies in the market of the arbitrageur and the hedgers affect 
the liquidity of the market. The probability of the arbitrageur arriving is 
denoted x, the probability of hedgers arriving is (1— x).
The assumptions on the random variables, the information structure and the 




























































































Random variables: x — y + z . 
y , z iid.
First security has payoff x . 






Trading and Price Formadon
Prices are set by a risk-neutral market-maker. He observes one order at a time, 
infers (in equilibrium) the relative likelihood that the order emanates from an 
informed trader or a hedger, sets price equal to conditional expected value, and 
meets the order from inventory (as in Glosten and Milgrom (1985)). In case 
both markets are open, the market-makers for each security are able to 
communicate.
Hedgers have a concave utility function U, and a risky endowment of W ± z ; 
W is normalized to zero WLOG. They first find out whether their endowment 
is Tor — z , then they are able to trade, and then z is realized. In case the 
endowment is z , they have a negative hedging need for the first security: they 
will hedge their endowment risk by selling short one unit of the security. 
Conversely if the endowment is — z , they have a positive hedging need and can 






























































































Hedgers are of two types: they may either be very risk-averse, or less risk- 
averse. With probability 5, the hedgers’ (if present) are very risk-averse and 
with probability (1 — S), they are less risk-averse. For the very risk-averse type, 
the hedgers’ utility function is U(w) = w for w <  0, and U(w) = aw for w 
> 0, where a 6 (0 , 1). Note that this may also be written U(w) = min{w, 
aw}, a more compact notation that will be used below. The less risk-averse 
type has a similar utility function, but with a different parameter: U(w) = 
min{w, /3w} where /36(a, 1).
The Arbitrageur
An arbitrageur knows the realization of z in advance of the trading round. The 
arbitrageur should be interpreted as an investment bank whose risk-aversion in 
a given market at any time depends on the positions it has taken in other 
markets, in relation to its capital. Thus, the arbitrageur acts as if his risk 
aversion is variable. This may be represented by U(w) =  w for w < 0, U(w) 
= yw for w > 0, where the initial endowment is 0 with probability 1 — e and 
100 with probability e (100 was chosen simply because it is a large number in 
relation to the amounts of money that can be made or lost by speculating in the 
assets considered here).
Effectively, therefore, the arbitrageur acts as if his risk aversion is variable, i.e. 
as if with probability e he were risk neutral, and with probability (1 — e) he were 
risk-averse with utility function U(w) = w for w < 0 ,  U(w) =  yw for w > 
0 where yE (0 , 1). For convenience, I shall refer to "the risk-neutral 
arbitrageur," or the "risk-averse arbitrageur," rather than "the arbitrageur 
whose initial wealth realization is 100" or "the arbitrageur whose initial wealth 
realization is 0." As a technical digression, note that in this formulation the 




























































































the higher wealth level (100). This is consistent with the standard property of 
decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA), although the piecewise linear utility 
function used here does not display DARA at all other wealth levels.
Remarks on the Assumptions
Functional Forms: The functional forms of the utility functions and the random 
variables have been chosen to be the simplest possible (the additive structure of 
the values of the two securities is similar to that in Oh (1994)). The results are 
not dependent on these functional forms. For example, many papers on price 
formation have used exponential utility functions and normally distributed asset 
returns (following Kyle (1985)). As an illustration, in Appendix 4 I give a 
version of the model in that framework and show the same results, effectively 
embedding a single-asset framework similar to that of Spiegel and Subramanyan 
(1992), generalized to allow a risk-averse informed trader, into a two-security 
model. The solutions, since they can only be derived numerically, are 
somewhat less transparent than those of the main model of the paper.
Price Formation Process: For the purposes of this paper, the details of the 
trading process are not particularly important. What is needed here is a trading 
mechanism that allows only partial revelation of private information (this 
implies that privately informed traders will profit to some extent from their 
information). The mechanism used here, proposed by Glosten and Milgrom 
(1985), is often used in the literature: recent examples include Biais and Hillion 
(1994) and Madhavan (1995). An earlier version of this paper used the price 
formation mechanism of Kyle (1985) with the same functional forms for utilities 
and distributions to derive the same results. Also, in Appendix 4 I present a 
version of the model with Kyle (1985) price formation, but with different 




























































































(1985), the market maker observes the (net) sum of the individual orders, 
whereas in Glosten and Milgrom (1985) he observes one of the orders selected 
at random. The advantage of the Glosten-Milgrom process is that agents do not 
face execution risk in their orders, i.e. when they place an order they know 
exactly at what price it will clear. This also makes the computation and 
exposition of the equilibrium simpler.
Although this is not a paper on market microstructure, the following brief 
comments on the realism of the Glosten-Milgrom price formation process seem 
appropriate: the mechanism is based on the actual institution of an NYSE 
market-maker, but seems equally suitable for modelling the trading process on 
the floor of a futures exchange. This is because the condition that price equal 
expected value, trade-by-trade, relies on Bertrand comjpetition. On the NYSE 
the market-maker is a monopolist but faces potential competition from the 
"crowd" of traders on the floor. On the floor of a futures exchange there is no 
single designated market-maker, but there is indeed a crowd of traders 
(including "locals") who are ready to take the opposite side of incoming orders 
at a competitively determined price. The model also seems reasonable as a 
description of the foreign exchange trading process, since normally the person 
initiating the trade will simultaneously ask for quotes from two or three dealers.
Information Flow between the Two Markets The assumption that the market 
makers for different securities can communicate is not important for the results. 
In fact, it is easy to verify that in this model there is no information gained (in 
equilibrium) from observing the orders in the other market, so that it makes no 
difference whether communication is possible. However, a priori one might 
imagine that allowing communication would make it harder to demonstrate the 




























































































maker to distinguish informed from uninformed trades). The model in the 
paper (including the version in Appendix 4) has therefore been chosen so that 
the results hold when orders from one market are fully visible in the other 
market.
3. Equilibrium with One Market
I start by considering the case where only the first market is open: I assume that 
the second market is exogenously closed, perhaps by regulatory fiat. Since 
similar models have been studied in the literature following Glosten and 
Milgrom (1985) and Kyle (1985), this is a standard problem.
In equilibrium the hedgers will trade an amount ± t, to be determined below. 
It follows that the arbitrageur will also trade ± t to avoid detection (if he does 
choose to trade). Any other quantity would reveal his information about the 
asset value to the market. There is a possibility that the arbitrageur, when risk- 
averse, will choose not to trade at all, because speculation forces him to bear 
the y -risk. Alternatively, both risk-averse and risk-neutral arbitrageurs may 
trade; which type of equilibrium occurs will depend on the values of the 
exogenous parameters. The focus of this paper is on the case where the 
exogenous parameters (particularly the cautiousness of the risk-averse 
arbitrageur) are such that in equilibrium the arbitrageur trades only if he is risk- 
neutral, while both types of hedger trade.
Since the risk-averse arbitrageur is inactive, with probability 7re there is a trade 
from a (risk-neutral) informed trader, with probability rr(l —e) there is no trade, 
and with probability (1 — 7r) there is a trade from a hedger. So the conditional 




























































































p be the price on a buy order. Since the expected value of the asset is 1 if an 
informed agent buys and 0 if an uninformed hedger buys, we have
p = 7re/[ 1 — 7r( 1 — e)].
Similarly, the price on a sell order is — 7re/[ 1 — tt( 1 — e)].
Next, I verify the condition for the arbitrageur to choose not to trade when he 
is risk-averse. Suppose that he learns that the realization of z will be 1. If he 
buys the asset, his wealth will be
t(x -p ) ,
i.e. it is equally likely to be t(2—p) or — tp (in case y =  1 or — 1, 
respectively). Similarly if he learns that z = — 1 and sells the asset, his wealth 
is —t(p — x"). In either case therefore his expected utility (conditional on being 
in the risk-averse region of his utility function) is:
>/2t[T(2 -p ) -  p].
He will choose not to trade whenever this is negative, i.e. when y  < p/(2—p).
When he is risk-neutral, the arbitrageur’s expected profits are t ( l — p) (i.e. his 
expected utility, conditional on being in the risk-neutral area of the utility 
function is 7 t( l—p)).
Next, consider the hedgers’ behaviour. Recall that the hedgers’ initial 




























































































will still be exposed to y- por tj,e ledgers with a positive hedging need who 
buy t units of the security at price p, their wealth is:
t(x -p )  -  z
= t(y + z -p )  -  z .
As shown in Appendix 1, the expected utility of the (more risk-averse) hedgers 
when they buy a quantity t is:
14[min{t(2 —7r)—1, /3[t(2 — it)— 1]} + /3(1—t7r) + (— 1— trr)
-I- min{l —t(2 + x), /3[l — t(2 + x)]}].
Their optimal hedging policy is to buy a quantity
t = l/(2 + p)
if a  < (1 —p)/(l + p), and not to trade at all otherwise. Symmetrically, hedgers 
with a negative hedging need will sell t =  1/(2-l-p) as long as a < 
(1—p)/(l+p). Their resulting expected utility is:
1A (a -l-2 p ) /(2 + p ) .
Again, Appendix 1 gives details of the computations for the above expressions. 
For the less risk-averse hedgers, similar expressions hold with a  replaced by 
(3, i.e. they trade a quantity t = l/(2 + p) as long as /3 <  (1—p)/(l+p), 




























































































To summarize the above derivation, the paper will consider situations where 
(with only the first market open) both types of hedgers trade, but the arbitrageur 
trades only when risk neutral. This imposes the following restrictions on the 
exogenous parameters: /3 < (1—p)/(l+p) and 7 <  p/(2—p), where p = xe/(l
-  7r( 1 — e ) ) .
4. Equilibrium with Both Markets Open
Now consider the case where both markets are open. An arbitrageur who takes 
a position in x" will be able to hedge his risk entirely in the new market, the 
market for y , and perform a riskless arbitrage. Hence the arbitrageur will 
always trade, even if risk-averse. As before, the amount he trades is the same 
as the hedgers, denoted f .  This increased arbitrage activity makes the 
equilibrium price less favourable to the hedgers, and the more risk-averse 
hedgers may drop out of the market. The paper focuses on the case where the 
exogenous parameters are such that this is indeed what happens.
Since the more risk-averse hedger is inactive, with probability tt there is a trade 
from an informed trader, with probability (1—7r)5 there is a trade from a 
hedger, and with probability (1 — 7r)(l —5) there is no trade. So the price on a 
buy order, which is equal to the conditional probability of an order coming 
from an informed trader, is
p' = 7r/[l—(1—x)(l —6)].
Similarly the price on a sell order is — p'.





























































































t'(x —p') -  t'y 
= t'(z -p ') .
So when he learns z = 1, he buys x , sells y , and makes a profit of t '( l  — p'). 
Similarly when he learns z = — 1, he sells x", buys y , and also makes profit 
t '( l  —p'). His expected utility (whether risk-neutral or risk-averse) is therefore:
T t 'd -P ') .
Next, consider the hedgers’ behaviour. They can hedge their endowment risk 
perfectly by taking appropriate positions in x and y”, but they may choose not 
to do so because of the cost of hedging (reflected in a high p'). For the 
hedgers with a positive hedging need who buy t' units of x" and sell t' units of 
y", their wealth is:
t'(x - p ')  -  t'y -  z
= t'(z - p ')  -  z .
As shown in Appendix 2, this results in expected utility (for the more risk- 
averse hedger) of
>/2[max{l -  t '( l+ p ') ,  a (l -  t'(l+p '))}] + '/2 [t '( l-p ')  -  1] 




























































































of a negative hedging need is symmetric. The discussion here has not derived 
the result that hedgers take equal and opposite positions of the same size in y 
and z ,  but that is straightforward to show. Similarly, the more risk averse- 
hedgers do not trade if /3 > (1 —p ')/(l+ p '). The hedgers’ maximal expected 
utility is —p 7 (l+ p ') . Details are in Appendix 2.
To summarize the above derivation, the paper will consider situations where 
(with both markets open) the arbitrageur always trades, but only the more risk 
averse-hedgers trade. This imposes the following restrictions on the exogenous 
parameters: a  < (1 —p ')/( l+ p ')  < 0 where p' =  tt/[1 —(1 —:r)(l —ô)].
5. Opening a New Market
The implications of the above analysis can now be drawn together into the 
following statement:
Theorem: It is possible that opening a new market may make everybody worse
o f f -
Proof: I will show that there are values of the exogenous parameters where all 
agents are made worse off. The exogenous parameters are a, (3, y, 5, e, and 
7r. To start with, consider the restrictions derived in sections 3 and 4, i.e. 13 
< (1 —p)/(l+p) and y  < p/(2—p), where p = 7re/(l — 7r(l—e)), and a < 
(1—p ') /( l+ p ')  < (3, where p ' = 7r/[l —(1 — 7r)(l —ô)]. They imply that when 
the new market opens, the less risk-averse hedgers will cease to trade. On the 
other hand, the risk-averse arbitrageurs, previously inactive, will now be willing 
to take speculative positions. This was shown in sections 3 and 4 above. 




























































































of 5, e, and x by choosing a and y  sufficiently small, and 0 in the interval 
[(l-p ')/(l+p '). (1-P)/(1+P)].
It is clear that the less risk-averse hedgers are worse off (by revealed 
preference). For the more risk-averse hedgers, this is less clear since although 
they now face a wider bid-ask spread in the market for x , they are now able 
to trade in f  also, which gives them a better hedge for their exposure to z . 
For them to be worse off, we require:
- p '/ ( l+ p ')  < V4(or— 1 —2p)/(2+p).
As shown in Appendix 3, substituting for p and p' in terms of the exogenous 
parameters, this is implied by:
2x[2(l —x) + 3tre] > (1 —7r+37re)[2x+5(l — tr)]. (1)
The arbitrageur now faces a wider spread in the market for x , but is able to 
construct a riskless arbitrage by trading in y also. For him to be worse off we 
need:
eT(l-p ) /(2 + p ) > y ( l—p ')/(l+ p ')
Substituting for p and p ', this becomes:
6/[2ir+6(l — tr) < e/[2 — 2ir + 3rre], (2)
as shown in Appendix 3. I will show that (1) and (2) may be satisfied 




























































































5 (hence small e also). In the limit, (1) becomes simply:
4x(l —7r) >  (1— x)27r,
which clearly holds. Setting e = k5 in (2) gives <5/[27r + S( l — tt) < 
k5/[2—2ir + 3xk5], i.e.:
k(2ir +  5(1-ir))  > 2(1 - x )  + 3k6.
In the limit, this becomes 2krr > 2(1—ir), i.e. it will hold if we set tr > 
l/(k + l) . For example k = ‘/i and x= % . Q.E.D.
A complete exploration of the different combinations of parameter values for 
which all agents are worse off, and of combinations for which various groups 
of agents are better off while others are worse off, would be of limited value 
(in relation to its complexity) given the special nature of the model. However, 
the intuition behind the parameter values chosen to derive the example is 
straightforward. For small y, the arbitrageur is very risk-averse at the lower 
initial wealth level (0) so is unwilling to trade except when arbitrage is riskless. 
Also, small a  means that the very risk-averse hedger will be willing to hedge 
with both markets open, even if the market (for x") is highly illiquid because 
of the high incidence of informed trading. 13 has to be chosen so that the less 
risk-averse hedgers are risk-averse enough that they want to trade when the first 
market is quite liquid (and the second market is closed), but not so risk-averse 
that they continue wanting to hedge when the first market becomes less liquid 
(as a result of the second market opening), -k large enough ensures there is 
enough arbitrage activity to make the effects studied here quite strong. When 




























































































the new market causes a big increase in arbitrage activity in the market for x-
When 5 becomes small, most hedgers are less risk-averse and will cease trading 
when the new market is open. Both the last two effects (small <5 and e) cause 
an increased bid-ask spread in the market for x as a result of the new market 
opening, and this tends to damage both arbitrageurs and the more risk-averse 
hedgers who continue to trade.
6. Concluding remarks
The model studied here is a special one. The model focuses on cross-market 
liquidity effects, and ignores many other effects such as the implications of 
more efficient security prices for allocative efficiency, individual incentives for 
futures exchanges or other financial innovators that may differ from social 
incentives, etc. Subject to these provisos, however, one can venture the 
following observations: introducing a new security in this type of model will 
increase the incidence of arbitrage activity, by making informed trading less 
risky. For hedgers, there is a trade-off between the increased illiquidity that 
may result and the greater flexibility to design appropriate hedges with a wider 
range of securities. Only if the former effect is very strong will they reduce 
their trades to the extent that even arbitrageurs are worse off - a possibility that 
is demonstrated in this paper.
To some extent, the intended contribution of this paper is methodological: 
analyzing the costs and benefits of financial innovation is an important area for 
research and policy. An obvious starting point for such research is to explore 
conditions under which introducing a new security may make all agents worse 
off, and there is an existing literature that has done so. The examples in this 




























































































clearing, and multiple commodities and rely on the effects of relative price 
movements of different commodities, compared across different states of the 
world. In contrast, this paper explores the question using an alternative 
framework: a single consumption good ("money"), heterogeneously informed 
traders, and price formation by a competitive market-maker, a framework that 
is widely used for finance research.
There are many interesting questions for further research on financial 
innovation. One of them concerns the order of opening of securities markets. 
In the model presented here, the order of opening of markets makes a 
difference in that the market for y is of no value, and would generate no 
trading, without the market for x. If the market for y were open first, opening 
the market for x would benefit everybody - though not as much, of course, as 
simultaneously closing the market for y. In that sense, the model in this paper 
exhibits the property that the order of opening of markets makes a difference. 
However, a more satisfactory, more dynamic treatment of this question would 
capture the fact that a market may become established, and liquidity develop 
over time, as a result of people trading the security.
Finally, a more general implication of the model in this paper is that a large 
part of trading volume may be due to speculators’ hedging needs. This is of 
interest because of the general inability of finance theory to explain high trading 
volume (see Dow and Gorton (1994)). It seems clear that similar effects to the 
ones studied in this paper will arise under a wider variety of conditions, and 






























































































Hedger’s optimization problem when only one market is open: as derived in the 
main text, the wealth of the (more risk-averse) hedgers with a positive hedging 
need who buy t units of the security at price p is t(x" — p) — z = 
t(y" +z — p) — z . Depending on the realized values of y" and z , there are 
four possible values of wealth:
1. y" = 1, z — 1 (which implies x" = 2).
Wealth: t(2 -p ) -  1
Utility: min{t(2—p) - 1, /3[t(2 —p) - 1]}.
2. y =  1, z =  — 1 (which implies x = 0).
Wealth: t(0 — p) + 1
Utility: (3[1 -  tp]
3. y" = — 1’ z" = 1 (which implies x" = 0).
Wealth: t(0 -p ) + 1
Utility: - 1  -  tp
4. y” =  — 1, 2" = — 1 (which implies x = —2).
Wealth: t ( - 2 - p )  + 1
Utility: min{l -  t(2+p), 0[ 1 -  t(2+p)]}.
The expected utility of the hedger is therefore:
14[min{t(2 —p) - 1, /3[t(2 — p) - 1]} + /3(1 -  tp) + ( - 1  -  tp)




























































































Note that of the four equiprobable possible values for wealth: t(2 — p) — 1, 1 — 
tp, — 1 — tp, 1 — t(2+p), the first is positive for t > 1/(2—p), while the last 
is positive for t < l/(2+p) (the second is always positive and the third always 
negative). Expected utility is therefore linear (or affine to be precise) in t on 
each of the three intervals [0, l/(2+p)], [l/(2+p), 1/(2 —p)] and [1/(2—p), 1], 
If follows that one of the four values 0, l/(2+p), 1/(2—p), 1 must be optimal 
for t.
On the interval [0, l/(2+p)], expected utility is
!4[t(2—p ) - l  + 0(1 -tp )  -  (1+tp) + 0(1 -  t(2+p))],
whose derivative with respect to t is V£(l — p — 0(1+p)). This is positive iff 
0 <  (1—p)/(l+p). Similarly, on the interval [l/(2+p), 1(2—p)], expected 
utility is
W[t(2—p ) - l  + 0(1-tp ) -  (1+tp) + (1 -  t(2+p))],
whose derivative with respect to t is !4(— 3p — 0p) < 0. Finally, on the 
interval [ 1 (2—p), 1], expected utility is
!4[0(t(2—p)—1) + 0(1-tp )  -  (1+tp) +  (1 -  t(2+p))],
whose derivative with respect to t is ‘/2[0(1—p) — (1+p)] < 0. This shows 





























































































Hedger’s optimization problem when both markets are open: as derived in the 
main text, the wealth of the (more risk-averse) hedgers with a positive hedging 
need who trade t units of the securities is t'(z —p') — z . Depending on the 
realization of z ,  wealth is equally likely to be either [t( — 1 —p') + 1] or 
[t(l —p') - 1]. Note that the latter is always negative, while the former is 
positive if t' < 1/(1+p). Hence expected utility is
V4[max{l -  t '( l+ p 'X  «(1 -  t'(l+p '))}] + V4[t'(l —p') -  1],
On the interval [0, 1/(1 +p')J this is
*/2«[l -  t '( l+ p ') l  + '/2 [t '( l-p ') -  1],
which is increasing in t' if the derivative, 'Aad  + p ') + Vi(l — p'), is positive, 
i.e. a  < (1 — p ')/(l +p')- On the interval [1/(1+p '), 1] expected utility is
‘/2[1 -  t '( l+ p ') ]  +  'A [t '( l-p ')  -  1] = - t 'p ' ,
so the hedgers will never trade more than 1/(1 +p '). Finally note that expected 





























































































Details for proof o f theorem: Consider the inequality in the text:
- p '/ ( l+ p ')  < 'A(a — 1 — 2p)/(2+ p).
Since the right-hand side exceeds —‘/i(l+2p)/(2+p), a sufficient condition for 
the inequality is given by —p 7 (l+ p ')  < — xh (\  +2p)/(2+p), or, substituting 
p = xe/(l — x(l — e)) and p' = x/[l — (1 — x)(l — ô)]:
— x/[l —(1 —x)(l —ô) + x] < — lÆ(l — x(l — e)+2xe)/[2 —2x(l — e)+ire]
or 2 x [2 ( l-x )  + 3xe] > ( l-x + 3 x e )[2 x + ô (l-x )] , which is inequality (1). 
Next, consider
T( l - p ') / ( l+ p ')  < eT( l —p)/(2+p).
Substituting for p and p ', we obtain:
[ 1 - ( 1 - t ) ( 1 - « ) - t ] / [ 1 - ( 1 - t ) ( 1 - 8 )  +  t ] < 
e(l —x(l — e) — xe)/[2—2x(l —e) + xe]
or
ô(l — x)/[2x+ô(l — x) < e(l — x)/[2-2x+3xe]. 





























































































Variant o f the model with CARA and normal distributions: as before, I assume 
x = y + z , where x is the first security and y" is the new security. The 
hedger has an initial endowment (risk exposure) — n z (he observes n before 
trading) and constant risk aversion Rh. The arbitrageur has constant risk 
aversion Ra and observes z . y , z and ff are independently normally 
distributed with mean zero and with variances cry, <r2z and o2„. Recall that an 
agent with normally distributed wealth w" and exponential utility (CARA) with 
risk aversion R will maximize Ew" — ‘/iRVa^w") (this can be seen from the 
moment-generating function of a normal random variable w" with mean /x and 
variance a2, i.e. T(t) =  E(exp(tw")) = exp(t/i+ Vita2)). (I shall refer to 
Ew" — 1/2RVar(w') as the agent’s objective, since it is not actually the agent’s 
expected utility, but is a strictly increasing function of expected utility.) Prices 
are set by a risk-neutral market maker who observes the total order flow in both 
markets and sets price equal to the conditional expected value of the asset (as 
in Kyle (1985)).
Because the functional forms used here imply continuous responses to changes, 
rather than the all-or-nothing responses of piecewise linear utilities, the analysis 
can be carried out with only one type of hedger and does not need the 
arbitrageur’s risk-aversion to be variable. Note that the exponential/normal 
functional forms used here could not be combined with the Glosten and 
Milgrom (1985) price formation process used in the main text since their 
market-maker samples a mixture of the individual orders, and a mixture of 
normals is not normal; hence the linearity of pricing and trading strategies 
would be lost.




























































































can be computed easily in terms of the other agents’ trading/pricing functions, 
the computations in terms of all the exogenous parameters have no closed-form 
solutions and can only be performed numerically, as shown in Appendix B of 
Spiegel and Subramanyan (1992) in a similar model with risk-averse informed 
trader. They also show that the linear equilibrium studied here will fail to exist 
for certain values of the exogenous parameters, in particular when the hedgers 
are not risk-averse enough. The question of existence of non-linear equilibrium 
remains open. Subject to these provisos, the model has a unique linear 
equilibrium which can be computed as follows.
With only the market for x" open, the hedger trades /3hn, the arbitrageur trades 
/3az, and the price is a multiple /3p of trading volume (for expositional clarity, 
the following derivation does not derive the fact that the intercept terms are 
zero). To derive /3P, note that E(y" + T  |/3hn+j3az) is given by the regression 
with slope
/3p =  Cov(z ,/3hn +|8az )/Var(j3hn +&:z ) = /31oyOJhV n+ 0 aV I).
The wealth of the hedger with an initial endowment - n z  who trades an amount 
t is:
t(x - p )  -  nz = t(y +z -j3p(t+/3az )) -  nz 
=  ty +  [t( l-/?„&)-n ]z  -  t2/3p,
which has expectation — /3pt2 and variance tVy +  [t( 1 — /3p/3a) — n]2cr2z. His 
objective is therefore to maximize -j3pt2 -  ViRh(tV y + [t(l— /3p/3a) - n ] V z). 




























































































-2 tft  -  %Rh(2ta2y+2[t(l-/3p̂ ) -n ]( l- /3 p0a)a22) =  0,
hence
ft = Rh(l-ftft)oV [2ft + Rh(<ft+(1 - f t f t ) V z)].
Substituting this into the hedger’s objective, it can be shown that the maximum 
value of the objective is l^n2Rhcr2z[/3h(l —/Sa/3p)— 1].
The wealth of an arbitrageur who observes z and trades t is:
t(x - p  ) = t(y + z - f t ( f tn  +t)),
which has expectation tz—ftt2 and variance ^[(ft + O ftftjV j- His objective is 
to maximize tz — /3pt2 — 1/2Rat2[a2v + (/3p/3h)2<T2n], which has first-order condition
z -  2tft -  tiy<ft + ( f t f t ) V j  = 0,
hence
ft = l/(2ft + RJcft+C ftftjV j.
Substituting into the arbitrageur’s objective gives the maximum value of the 
objective as Viftz2.
When both markets are open, the price is given by the same regression:




























































































The wealth of the hedger with an initial endowment — nz- wj,0 tracjes an amount 
t of asset x and - t  of asset y is:
t(z - p  ) -  nz = t(z -/3p'(t+/3a'z )) -  nz 
= [t(l-/3p'/3a') -n ]z  -  t2/3p',
which has expectation - f t ' t 2 and variance [t(l —/3p'/3a') — n]2tr2z. His objective 
is to maximize - f t ' t 2 -  ViRh[t(l-j3p'/8a') - n ] V z). The first-order condition
is:
-2t/3p' -  Rh[ t ( l - l3p7 V ) - n ] ( l - /y 0 aV z ) =  o,
hence
ft' =  R n d -f t 'f tV z /P ft '+ R h d -f t 'f t ' jV j .
The wealth of an arbitrageur who observes z and trades t of x and — t of y" is: 
t (z -p  ) =  t(z-/3p'(ft 'n  +t)),
which has expectation tz—/3p't2 and variance t2(j3p'/3h')2<72n- His objective is to 
maximize tz -  f t 't 2 -  1/2Rat2O3p'f t ') 202n, which has first-order condition
z -  2 tft ' -  tRa(/3p'/3h')2̂ „  = 0,
hence




























































































As before, substituting the optimal values of /3h and /3a into the objectives gives 
maximum values for the hedger’s objective of V̂ n2Rhcr2z[/Sh'(l —/8a /3p') — 1] and 
of ‘/2|Sa'z2 for the arbitrageur’s objective. Therefore, the hedger will be made 
better off by the new market iff /3h'( l- /3 a'/?p') > /3h(l —/3a/3p), while the 
arbitrageur will be better off iff j3a' > /3a. Using this, the following numerical 
calculations show values of the exogenous parameters for which both the hedger 
and the arbitrageur are worse off:
Exogenous parameters: Ra = 2.3, Rh= l . l ,  o2y=0.1, <r2 = 0.8 and r n = 3.8 
Endogenous parameters: /3h=0.2584, /3a=0.4237, 0p = O.8529, |3h' = 0.2142, 
/3a' =0.3914, /3p' = 1.0545.
Note that /3a = 0.4237 > /3a' = 0.3914, while /3h(l — /3a/3p) = 0.1651 > 
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